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This issue presents the first paper delivered at the Fourth Annual
Conference of the Guild of Catholic Lawyers of New York, in December 1956. The other paper on the natural law and its application to
religious schools under the United States Constitution, by Professor
John Cornelius Hayes, will appear in the April 1957 issue.

THE NATURAL LAW AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
EDWIN P. MCMANUS*

A LTHOUGH THE TITLE

of this address speaks in terms of "The Fifth
Amendment," I take it that we all understand that therein we refer
not to the entire amendment but to that clause of it which reads: "No
person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." The other sections of the amendment excite little debate and
raise few, if any, natural law problems.
Perhaps no subject has been more widely discussed and debated in
legal circles during the past three or four years than this one of the
invocation of the so-called "self-incrimination clause" of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The witness before
a Congressional committee who refused to answer " . . . on the ground

that I might incinerate myself" is well known, and in his case, at least,
possibly not so far from the mark.
Yes, the discussions have been many and at times attempts have been
made to couple the purely legal aspects of the question with considerations of pertinent natural law principles. I have in mind especially the
excellent program sponsored by Marquette University which put on the
same platform, at the same time, the Reverend John R. Connery, S.J.,
Dean Erwin N. Griswold of Harvard Law School and Mr. C. Dickerman
*B.A. (1935),

LL.B. (1938),

town University Law Center.
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Williams of the New York Bar. However,
my attention has been drawn to no previous
instance where a discussion of the legal
problems and those related to the natural
law has been undertaken by one man.
I am sure that we are agreed that this is
a subject of tremendous scope; a
subject upon
which many more
words than I
shall, or could,
use in this address might profitably be expended. It will be my
aim to deal with
a few of the probEDwIN P. MM ANVs
lems which are inherent in the subject as a
practical man; as distinguished, perhaps
fairly, from a university professor. I am
aware that there is a well established school
of thought which holds that the more an
address, or an article, is practical, the less
it is scholarly. However I do not subscribe
to this view.
I should like to hasten to establish a frame
of reference. I am sure that we can agree
that we must discuss this subject against the
background of the Communist conspiracy.
Not to do so, I think, would bespeak something less than intellectual integrity. I readily
concede that we have had some problems
with regard to what this clause meant when
used in connection with relatively uncomplicated crimes such as murder. These, however, have been as nothing compared with
the tumult and the shouting which has arisen
since the general and indiscriminate invocation of the privilege by suspected Communists has become the mode. Surely, it is in
this area that attempts have been made, with
considerable success, to extend the privilege

far beyond its metes and bounds as previously understood.
I hope that we can further agree that none
of us would repeal this clause of the Fifth
Amendment. To many of you, perhaps to all
of you, this may seem a laboring of the obvious. Yet Ihave read a number of otherwise
illuminating articles on this subject wherein
so much time and space was given to the
establishment of this premise that too little
remained for a discussion of the truly provocative questions which arise in an area
where reasonable men may honestly differ.
Parenthetically, let me say that following a
nation-wide television program where I discussed the Fifth Amendment and voiced
some opposition to its extension to what I
considered to be unreasonable lengths, I was
inundated with letters. Most, I am happy to
say, were very kind. What surprised me however, was the fact that those which were
critical indicated that I had been too moderate in not favoring the abolishment of the
privilege. Most of us know that this would
run contrary to history, the law and the
natural law. However, on the record, a rejection of this position seems necessary.
Finally, before getting to the real core of
the problem, I should like to eliminate one
other area in which I consider extensive discussion to be unprofitable. May we agree,
that where the privilege is available at all, it
is available equally in a criminal case, in a
civil case or before a Congressional committee? In fact, may we not agree that the
net effect of many judicial interpretations
culminating in the recent Quinn and Emspak
cases' has been effectively to delete the
words ". . . in any criminal case. . ." from
the meaning of the privilege? I say this very
much on a "you can't fight City Hat" basis.
'Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190 (1955);
Quinn v. United States, 349 U. S. 155 (1955).
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I am reasonably certain that this result was
not the intention of the framers of the Constitution. I am by no means certain that it
would be their intention today. I rather think
that it would not. Moreover, I am aware that
the most persuasive arguments can be and
have been made that this result is wrong. I
have particular reference to an article in the
American Bar Association Journal by Mr.
R. Carter Pittman of the Georgia Bar, which
reaches that very conclusion. 2 I confess I am,
to some degree, persuaded by a number of
Mr. Pittman's thoughtful propositions. However, because I feel that the decisions of the
Supreme Court have taken us beyond the
point of no return, I think that we must, to
be realistic, accept the conclusion that the
privilege is as fully available before a Congressional committee as before a United
States District Court.
First: we will cast the discussion against
the background of the Communist conspiracy. Second: none of us would repeal the
Fifth Amendment. Third: the privilege
against self-incrimination is not limited to
criminal cases.
I have heard no one dispute that, of recent
years, the interpretations placed upon the
amendment by the Supreme Court have
greatly expanded it. Whether this has been
for good or bad has been much debated but,
I think, the underlying fact has not. No
longer do we hear courts refer to one who
invokes the privilege as "a self-confessed
criminal."' 3 No longer do we find this defense
judicially lambasted as "one not resorted to
by honest men."'4 Instead the Supreme Court
appears to be telling us, in its latest pro2 The Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956).
3 Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591, 605 (1896).
4 United States v. Mammoth Oil Co., 14 F. 2d 705,
729 (8th Cir. 1926).
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nouncements, that the witness who invokes
the privilege of the Fifth Amendment; thereby sets in motion some sort of a new and
different presumption, running in his favor,
which forecloses any of us from drawing any
inferences whatever from his conduct. However, even the Court seems to have some
doubt as to whether it can accomplish this
result. It has shown an awareness that notwithstanding its expressed wishes, the public
mind does not slip into neutral when the
privilege is invoked. The Court recently said:
"[I]f it is true that in these times a stigma
may somehow result from a witness's reliance on a Self-Incrimination clause, a committee should be all the more ready to
recognize a veiled claim of the privilege." 5 I
shall refrain from comment on this remarkable thesis; that because our friends, neighbors and the community may think ill of us
for doing something, our right to do it is
enlarged. I will confine myself to the observation that, at least, the quotation displays
a judicial understanding that a stigma does
attach to the invocation of the privilege.
Perhaps my principal premise in this address lies in the fact that I have sensed, and
I use the word advisedly because I could not
put my finger on the source of my feeling,
that Catholic lawyers and Catholic law students somehow developed a feeling that
there is something morally wrong about
arguing against this extension of the Fifth
Amendment, and something both morally
wrong and illegal about attaching any stigma
to the witness who takes advantage of it. I do
not hold with such a view and it shall be my
purpose to demonstrate that it is neither
required nor supported by the natural law.
Let us discuss this stigma and do it, as we
proposed, in terms of communism's threat to
5 Emspak v. United States, 349 U. S. 190, 195
(1955).
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our nation. Let us take, for example, the case
of a college professor. I am sure that you are
aware that Dean Griswold has written, at
length, on this subject. The Dean, as a matter of fact, has developed a new technique
in dealing with the problem. He uses the
same title no matter what he says. For
example if you read "The Fifth Amendment
Today" as distributed, gratis, by the Fund
For The Republic, and "The Fifth Amendment Today" as it appears in the Winter,
1955-56, volume of the Marquette Law
Journal, both by Griswold, you will find
yourself reading two quite different articles.
At any rate, the Dean shows a degree of
consistency. In both articles he suffers and
bleeds over the fate of a witness before a
Congressional committee. In the latter
article the witness is identified only as a
"poor devil." In the former the Dean is more
specific and identifies his man as a "college
teacher." I should like, for purposes of illustration, to borrow Dean Griswold's troubled
"college teacher" and I should like also to
call him "Professor X." Now, I not only
concede, I aver, that the Dean knows this
"college teacher" better than I do. He has
probably known him for a long time. In fact
he may know Professor X2, X3 and X4. It
may be this very familiarity which leads
Dean Griswold into what, I believe, are
wrong conclusions. In any event, I do not
know "Professor X," so at least my observations about him will be completely objective,
a consummation I should hope, devoutly to
be wished. Let us construct a hypothetical
case in which "Professor X" plays the leading role, and let us make it completely
uncomplicated. We will ask him no devious
questions about his past associations. Instead
we will put him before a properly constituted
Congressional committee and ask him the
completely unambiguous question, "Are

you, right this minute, a Communist?" As
"Professor X" ponders his answer to that
question, let us, as we hope the professor
will, look at the precedents. Where does the
professor find himself?
I suggest that we begin with the opinion
of Chief Justice John Marshall in the Aaron
Burr case. 6 Those of you who have gained
a degree of familiarity with this subject may
be surprised to find me using this precedent.
It is more often cited by those who take a
position quite different from mine. Yet, I
find considerable solace in it. I am gratified
by these words of the great Chief Justice: "If
the declaration [that the witness's answer
would incriminate him] be untrue, it is in
conscience and in law as much a perjury as
if he had declared any other untruth upon
his oath.. .. " Many other quotations from
the Supreme Court to the same effect are
readily available, but they are merely cumulative, so I confine myself to just this one.
Return with me now to "Professor X."
The professor is, we find, in terms of the
Fifth Amendment, in something of a spot.
In terms of the natural law, as we shall see,
he is in even more of a spot. The professor
is either a Communist or he is not. If he is,
he clearly has a legal right to invoke the
privilege, not because being a Communist is
in itself a crime, because it isn't, but because
an affirmative answer might form a "link in
the chain" which might convict him of something. Please note, that in spite of this rather
"iffy" rationale, if the professor is a Communist his right to the privilege is absolute
under the law. Now let us examine his natural law position. The natural law recognizes the right to silence. It says that a man
may remain silent or give an evasive answer
6 United States v. Burr, In re Willie, 25 Fed. Cas.

No. 14692e (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
7 Id. at 40.
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when the answer to the question would cause
the loss of his life or, in ancient times, would
cause him to be sentenced to the galleys, or
would result in the loss of all his property,
or would result in a complete loss of his
reputation. How does "Professor X" stand?
Clearly his answer will not cost him his life,
nor a sentence to the galleys, nor will all
of his property be confiscated. I wish I were
more positive that it would result in the
complete loss of his reputation. However, it
certainly should have that effect with all right
thinking people so we may assume that the
professor has at least a prima facie natural
law right not to answer. Thus far, it would
appear that his legal and natural law positions are identical. This is not the case. The
natural law right to silence is not absolute.
It disappears if the withholding of the information would result, for example, in a
calamity to the community. So, in order to
justify himself under the natural law, the
professor will have to ask himself this additional question. Will the withholding of this
information result in a national calamity?
What is the answer? I should like to leave
that question unanswered for a few minutes.
We shall deal with it directly.
Return with me again to the professor.
This time we will assume that he is not a
Communist. The natural conclusion would
seem to be that if he is to avoid the charge
of perjury under the Marshall definition, he
must answer the question in the negative.
But, one might say, not so fast. This professor is not a Communist but in the past his
boyish enthusiasm led him to join a number
of organizations which have now been
labeled somewhat subversive by the Attorney General of the United States. The professor is frightened and confused. He is
afraid that if he answers "No" these past
affiliations will be dragged out and that he
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will then be prosecuted for perjury. Parenthetically, why is it that hypothetical witnesses are always frightened and confused
while the actual ones are assured to the point
of arrogance and are invariably flanked by
expensive legal talent? Passing that, however, we return to the point. Suppose, on the
stated grounds the witness elects to invoke
the privilege. He does so at his peril. The
propriety of conduct will be measured by
objective standards which approximate the
"reasonable man" test. Perhaps we can best
deal with this question on a reductio ad
absurdum basis. If I, at some later date, am
asked: "Were you in New York on December 15, 1956?", I think we can all agree that
I cannot refuse to answer the question
merely because I know that a murder took
place in New York on that day. It is true that
it is possible, "Alice in Wonderland" possible to be sure, but possible, that I may be
connected with the crime and prosecuted,
but the probabilities are all against it. Accordingly, I submit, no one would allow me
the invocation of the privilege under such
circumstances. Now, if the question is:
"Were you in the Biltmore Hotel, in New
York, on December 15, 1956?" and I know
that a murder took place in the Biltmore on
that date and I was staying there, the problem changes a great deal. My point is, that in
the final analysis, everything turns upon the
reasonableness of my apprehension of prosecution. This must be measured by external
criteria, quite apart from my subjective determination. This is the positive law. How
stands the natural law? The natural law
agrees. In fact, again, the natural law goes
further. It says that even if my subjective
determination is sincere and my apprehension of prosecution is real, the law may
punish me if by its standards I am wrong.
This is because under the natural law society
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has rights as well as the individual, and the
fact that an individual may be punished for
doing what he subjectively thinks is right,
while not a happy result, is a permissible
one, justified by the larger interest of the
community. The natural law apprehends
that were any other standard adopted, were
the decision on whether to speak or not to
speak left entirely to the subjective determination of the witness, all orderly inquiry,
to which society is entitled, would disappear.
Once again then, the professor, by whatever
standard, must speak or accept the consequences. How shall he evaluate the risks of
silence? It seems that since he will have to
defend his silence on the basis that it is
reasonable, he will have to look at the record
to ascertain the extent to which it illuminates
the problems of persons in his situation. To
the professor, the record will prove alarming
if he is bent on silence-no indictments, no
prosecutions, no convictions, in fact, to resort to the vernacular, no nothing. How
reasonable then is the professor's apprehension? I leave the answer to you.
Before we return to our unanswered question may we digress briefly for a practical
consideration? What, under these circumstances, is the situation of the employer of
"Professor X?" Put aside all of the pious
platitudes about what the employer should
think. What does he think? Well, if he is a
normal, average man, his mental processes
are apt to be extremely uncomplicated. He
thinks: "If this fellow isn't a Communist,
why did he 'take' the Fifth Amendment? He
is either a Communist or a perjurer, and he's
fired." What are we to say of this unsophisticated approach? Well, the first thing
we can say is that there is an excellent chance
that he is absolutely right. But is there a
possibility that he is wrong? Yes, there is, if
we postulate the confused, frightened wit-

ness of our earlier hypothetical case. On the
possibility that this may be the situation,
must the employer now refrain from discharging the employee, or is it the other way
round? Is it not the duty of the employee
to demonstrate to his employer that his confusion or fright was the cause of the unfortunate situations? Surprisingly, perhaps,.
the law of Torts will help us here. In nontechnical language the rule is that where two
innocent parties are involved, and where as
a result of their innocent conduct damage is
threatened, the damage must be borne by
the one whose act, however innocent,
brought the situation to pass. That the employer would be damaged by retaining this
employee is, I think, beyond dispute. It is
a fact of life that the average man does
make the inference we have described.
Whose act created this situation? Certainly
not the employer's. Should the employer
leave the door open to the employee to explain his conduct and should he retain him
upon a satisfactory explanation? Emphatically, yes. But must the employer assume the
burden of independently rebutting the inference which has naturally arisen in his
mind; of conducting an independent investigation to establish his employee's innocence?
Just as emphatically, no. I will agree, however, that the Supreme Court has ruled
otherwise.8 I will say that I think that the
ruling is somewhat distinguishable in that
the employer there was a political subdivision which the court thought was uniquely
able to conduct an independent investigation, but I will hasten to add that to the
extent that this distinction does not account
for the ruling, the ruling is, in my opinion,
wrong. I will thereby put myself in the company of four justices of the Supreme Court.
s Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U. S.
55 (1956).
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And even more importantly, for our purposes, I am honored to say that in so far as
the natural law is concerned I have put myself in the company of at least two moral
theologians of note, Father Francis E.
Lucey, S.J., Regent of the Georgetown Law
Center, and Father Robert Springer, S.J.,
Professor of Moral Theology at Woodstock
College. I do not say that all moral theologians will agree on this point any more than
all lawyers will. I merely say that I am entirely satisfied with the company in which
I find myself.
At last, we return to the question we have
left unanswered. Remember, we have assumed that the professor is a Communist. As
we have said, under the Fifth Amendment
his right to refuse to answer is nonetheless
absolute, but under the natural law this is
not the case. Under the natural law, we saw,
the right disappears in the face of the threat
of a national calamity. An examination of
the dimensions of this natural law rule would
seem appropriate. Need I labor the point
that the Communist conspiracy raises the
greatest threat of national calamity that our
nation has ever known? Communism successful, would destroy freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
and if it could, freedom to think and freedom to pray. In sum, it would destroy every
vestige of the dignity of man; that creature
made in the image and likeness of God. We
would have no further discussions about the
natural law. To mention the words would
be a crime against the state. An assembly
of this kind would assure all of us a ride in
the tumbrel, or worse. I cite no authorities
for this view. I feel that I need not. I am confident, that were he here, I could count on
Josef Cardinal Mindszenty as a strong ally.
I trust I have made my point. I trust that
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we are agreed that in terms of national calamity communism represents the ultimate
threat. Now if this is so, we have said the
natural law right to silence, in connection
with questions pertaining to this threat, disappears. This seems almost too simple. Is
anything else necessary as a condition precedent to the loss of the right? The answer
is "yes." The moral theologian will say that
in addition to the enormity of the threat,
there must be some degree of imminence.
This means that the threat of national calamity must not be completely remote, must
not be a phantom to be apprehended only by
those who flinch at a shadow. It must be
real, something which will furnish a logical
basis for apprehension. How then, is this
"imminence factor" to be computed? Here
we find unanimity among the moral theologians upon one basic and tremendously important point. All agree that in determining
the degree of imminence necessary to the
loss of the right of silence, consideration
must be given to the enormity of the evil.
Simply stated, this means that the greater the
anticipated evil, the less significant becomes
the necessity for imminence. If this sounds
familiar to you, it should. It is almost identical with the language first used by Judge
Learned Hand9 and later adopted by Chief
Justice Vinson in the Dennis case' ° in describing the "clear and present danger rule."
Judge Hand said, and the Chief Justice
agreed: "In each case they [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted
by its improbability, justifies such invasion. . . ." In the Dennis case, the problem
was whether or not the right of free speech
should be restrained. The natural law takes
9 United States v. Dennis, 183 F. 2d 201, 212 (2d
Cir. 1950).
10Dennis v. United States, 341 U. S. 494, 510
(1951).
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an almost identical position with regard to
the right of silence. In these terms, if we
make the evil to be apprehended equal infinity, and I think that is fair, is it not obvious
that the "imminence factor" virtually disappears from our formula? But what am I
saying? Am I upholding the proposition that
there is never a natural law right to remain
silent if the question pertains to communism? Not quite; but I am very close to that
position. I will agree that there could be a
case, where even though the witness is a
Communist, his connection with the conspiracy is so minimal as to remove altogether
the "imminence factor" which we have said
is necessary. Even in this case however, I
would point out that such a witness faced
with the question "Are you a Communist?"
is in quite a different situation than would
obtain if the question were "Are you a bookmaker?". In the latter case his natural law
right to remain silent is clear; in the former
his right is, to say the least, less clear. By the
same token, I trust that it is evident that we
have only to change the nature of the witness
somewhat, and it becomes obvious that he
has no right to silence. To go to the extreme,
suppose that the witness is the President of
the United States or the Secretary of State.
Clearly there is no natural law right to silence
now, because the positions which these officials hold supply all the imminence which
is required. These men would never have a
natural law right to remain silent, yet, please
note, that their right under the Fifth Amendment is absolute.
Drawing the line is not easy. Deciding
when a witness, by virtue of his position or
other characteristics has supplied the necessary "imminence factor" is beset with difficulties. I submit however, that all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the duty to

testify because under the natural law, as well
as under the positive law, the right to silence
is an exception to the general rule, and accordingly, in both places, is to be narrowly
construed. I submit further that with every
day that passes, with every tick of the clock,
we come closer to the point where, unless
the history of the last half century suddenly
reverses itself, we will have reached a situation where no one, whatever his station in
life may be, will have a natural law right to
be silent to this vital question. My justification is that knowing how many Communists
there are, without more, may well prove of
the utmost importance in containing this
threat.
You may have gained the impression that
communism frightens me. If you have, you
are right, it does. Further, I do not believe
that leaning back, in a gallus snapping pose,
and with an avuncular air pontificating, "I
am confident that we can deal with communism," supplies my answer. Yes, communism frightens me. What is now happening in Hungary, Poland and the Middle East,
frightens me. Scorn my cowardice if you will,
but understand please, that what I am trying
to do is to lay hands on the bomb while it
still has a long fuse. That the bomb exists,
and that the fuse is lighted, is beyond
dispute.
I have said that I have sensed a feeling
among Catholic lawyers and Catholic law
students that to take a position that the privilege of the Fifth Amendment was not to be
extended was somehow morally wrong. I
have tried to demonstrate that, at least in
some cases the extension has gone beyond
the natural law. It is obvious that the natural law does not compel such an extension.
In some cases, such as the hypothetical situation of the Secretary of State as a witness,
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the natural law would deplore his putting
his personal safety above the national safety.
Accordingly I repeat, that this feeling, if it
does exist, is not well founded.
Of course we want to retain the Fifth
Amendment and not one of us would be
without it. To the extent that the Fifth
Amendment is used to protect, even the
guilty, it is good. To the extent that it is used
as an instrument for overthrowing our form
of government, it is bad. The distinction is
not always easily made. Therefore, do not be
too quick to condemn the employer who acts
upon the inferences which his intellect presents to him, or those segments of the public
whose views are compelled by similar natural
inferences. The natural law is instinctive,
and they may both have instinctively hit
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upon correct natural law conclusions. Further, you will find that they are not without
legal friends. Were they sufficiently fluent,
they might have expressed their views as a
Federal Court once did when it said:
It is a principle of human nature - and
every man is conscious of it, I apprehend, that if he does an act which he is conscious
is wrong, his conduct will be along a certain
line. He will pursue a certain course not in
harmony with the conduct (of) a man who
is conscious that he has done an act which
is innocent, right and proper. The truth is
-and it is a scriptural adage -"that the
wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the
righteous are bold as a lion." 11
11 From the charge to the jury in Starr v. United
States, 164 U. S. 627 (1897), as set forth in Problems of the Fifth Amendment, by C. D. Williams,
24 FORDHAM L. REV. 19, 39-40 (1955).
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